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SHOULD THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX BE
SIMPLIFIED?
By ROBERT B. EICHHOLZ t
NEWSPAPER editorial writers, columnists and cartoonists reserve some
of their choicest phrases for the spectacle of the harassed taxpayer in his
annual struggle to comply with the demands of the federal tax collector.
It is not unjustifiably felt that the pains of paying taxes should not be
rendered too protracted and excruciating by keeping the victim ignorant
of how to pay. The universally recommended anesthetic is "simplifica-
tion." It has come to be regarded as axiomatic that the federal tax laws
in general and the income tax in particular should be made less compli-
cated, and that we should strive for both a simple tax law and a tax
law simply stated. During last year's widespread public discussion of
possible changes in the federal tax structure, scarcely an article was
written or a suggestion made that did not at some point enter a plea for
simplicity. It is assumed on every hand that simplification will result in
a fairer statute, in greater ease of administration and in a reduction of
the expense and irritation that often accompany the proper computation
of a taxpayer's liability. The argument for simplicity is usually considered
so obvious as not to require further statement. When the question is
examined, however, the suspicion arises that the last thing the taxpayer
would really want is this almost universally recommended cure-all for
our tax troubles.
The American ancestors of the income tax were very simple levies.
In Colonial New England and other American colonies, there existed
various "faculty" taxes upon the yearly earnings from certain employ-
ments, assessed by classes.' Having as much in common with the property
taxes which they supplemented as with the modern income tax, they were
levied not upon the taxpayer's actual earnings, but upon the earnings
which he was assumed to derive from the occupation in which lie engaged.
Secretary of the Treasury Wolcott, in his report of 1796, had this
to say about the faculty taxes:
"In some states those taxes are attempted to be proportioned to
the gains and profits of individuals, in which cases they are both
arbitrary and unequal; in other states the taxes are uniform, in which
cases they are only unequal . . .
t Member of Legislative Counsel's staff, United States Treasury Department. Al-
though the writer is employed by the Treasury Department, the views set forth herein
are his own and are not to be regarded as the views of the Department. The present
article is a revision of material presented before the New York City Chapter of the
National Lawyers' Guild, April 7, 1938.
1. See E. R. A. SELIGMAr, TaE INcOmE TAX (2d ed. 1914) 367.
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"It is impossible to render them exactly equal; that they are easy
of collection, that their operation is indirect, and that they are capable
of being rendered perfectly certain, are recommendations in their
favor.'
2
The first effective federal attempt at an income tax was the Civil War
Act of 1862.' It comprised only eight sections and came near to taxing
gross income. It subjected to tax income "from any source whatever" and
allowed only a deduction for taxes "assessed upon the property from
which the income is derived." At that time even tie Commissioner of
Internal Revenue was moved to remark that the income tax was "de-
prived . . . of all claims to public favor," largely because of its "inquisi-
torial" character.4 He regarded as worthy of comment the forbearance
of taxpayers in accepting it "to meet a temporary exigency." The law
was slowly improved upon, and by 1870 had attained to some approxi-
mation of a concept of net income' through the allowance of a few
additional deductions. In the process of rendering them more palatable,
the original eight sections had increased to twelve.
The Act of 1894,7 which Mr. Choate so dramatically denounced as
"communistic" and, climactically, as "populistic," s allowed deductions for
interest, business and farming expenses, taxes, losses from fires, storms
and shipwreck, and bad debts. By the 1913 Act' seventeen pages were
needed to write an income tax law, though that document hardly seems
formidable when compared with the more than one hundred and forty
pages which were required for the Revenue Act of 1938. o
Thus in sheer bulk the income tax act has grown with fearsome rapid-
ity. In the space of 25 years its length has increased approximately eight-
fold. But the present Act itself does not include all the law on the subject.
The new Internal Revenue Code" contains, in addition to the provisions
of the Revenue Act of 1938, many miscellaneous provisions relating to
income tax which were taken from the Revised Statutes or from previ-
ously unrepealed portions of prior Revenue Acts. The Revenue Act of
2. 1 American State Papers, Finance, 439.
3. 12 STAT. 432 (1862). The earlier Act of 1861 [12 STAT. 292] never went into
effect.
4. REPORT ON THE FINANCES, 1862-63, 70.
5. 16 STAT. 256 (1870).
6. See MAGILL, TAxAmLE Ixco.mE (1936) 295.
7. 28 STAT. 553 (1894), 31 U. S. C. § 372 (1934).
8. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 532 (1895).
9. 38 STAT. 166 (1913), 43 U. S. C. § 151 (1934).
10. 52 STAT. 447, 31 U. S. C. A. § 752 (1938).
11. The Code went into effect as absolute law February 10, 1939. It is a compila-
tion of all internal revenue statutes in effect on January 2, 1939, and all such statutes are
therein expressly repealed. The Revenue Act of 1938 has thus been superseded by the
Internal Revenue Code (cited as I. R. C.) although no substantive changes have been
made in the text of the statute.
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1938 was the thirteenth major effective change in the income tax law
since 1913, not including various amendments which were introduced by
non-revenue legislation such as the National Industrial Recovery Act.1
A problem involving one taxable year is very often not to be solved by
the same provision that governed the identical situation in the preceding
or subsequent taxable year, and it is frequently difficult to determine
which set of provisions is applicable to a particular transaction.
This bewildering mass of legislation does not begin to embody all the
essential federal income tax law. Court decisions and administrative
rulings are quite as important as the statutes. The American Federal
Tax Reports, containing all the federal court decisions on federal taxa-
tion, now run to nineteen volumes. Since its inception in 1924, the Board
of Tax Appeals has issued thirty-eight volumes of published opinions.
Moreover, the published rulings of the Treasury Department fill many
additional volumes. And the overwhelming majority of cases decided
and questions ruled upon involve the income tax.
Necessarily, little of this material is couched in layman's language.
The taxpayer cannot hope to cope with its vast bulk, its involved language
or its infinitude of technicalities. The lawyer or accountant who does
not specialize in tax matters often feels himself equally at a loss. It has
been rather appropriately stated that "our Federal tax scheme has become
one of the law's most fearsome technical toys."' 3
By definition, the primary requisite of a good tax law is that it raise
revenue. The most technically perfect revenue statute is completely useless
if it does not bring money into the Treasury. There are many secondary
tests that may be applied in judging a tax, most of them highly contro-
versial, but three upon which all would probably agree are equity, cer-
tainty and ease of administration. A good tax must distribute its burden
fairly. as between taxpayers, in accordance with their relative abilities
to bear it. The face of the statute itself should reveal the extent of tax
liability in a given transaction without the need for further judicial or
administrative interpretation of ambiguous phraseology. In addition, the
costs of collection should be kept at a minimum, so as not to absorb an
appreciable amount of the revenue raised.
The faculty taxes of colonial times were almost absurdly simple, yet
no one would argue for their fairness. A gross receipts tax would do
away with most of the vexing and complicated problems which arise
under an income tax, but it would not even approximate a reliable measure
of a taxpayer's ability to pay. A tax on gross income would be simpler
than one on net income, yet it would take no account of such variables
12. 48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. §§ 701-2 (1934).
13. Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxatlonl
(1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1333.
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as the expenses incurred in one's trade or business which are now allowed
as deductions. Equity and simplicity do not always go hand in band.
Simplicity may be gained at the sacrifice of certainty. "Ordinary and
necessary expenses . . .in carrying on any trade or business," 14 allowed
as a deduction, is a simple and non-teclmical phrase the meaning of which
seemingly should be clear to the least sophisticated. But several hundred
decisions extending over a period of many years have not yet established
with certainty its precise meaning when applied to a given situation.
The phrase "earnings or profits,"' 5 used. for ascertaining the taxability
of corporate distributions, and the phrase "other property or money,"' 1
used in determining recognition of gain or loss, are similar in their
simplicity, but after the passage of twenty-three and fifteen years respec-
tively, no one can define their meaning with any degree of exactitude.
Nor does simplicity always make for ease of administration. MNany
of the complexities of the present capital gains and losses provisions could
be eliminated by the adoption of the recommendation of the Twentieth
Century Fund that "every holder of property . . . be required to report
the value of his holdings at the end of the year, and enter the gain-
or loss--that had accrued since the end of the previous year, or since
the date of purchase if he bought within the year."' 7 Leaving aside the
possible constitutional questions involved in this procedure, the necessity
for an annual valuation of the property of every taxpayer would impose
an almost insuperable burden on the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In
general, it may be said that as greater discretion is vested in the Com-
missioner by the statute, its text will become somewhat simpler. But the
work of the Bureau will thereby become correspondingly heavier, re-
sulting in increased costs of collection and greater delay in the termina-
tion of cases.
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that much can be done in the direc-
tion of simplifying the administrative provisions of our tax laws. Many
of these provisions are antiquated,"8 dating from the Revised Statutes
of 1879. Many bear little or no relation to present conditions and present
tax levies. Many have been encrusted with whole series of amendments
which render them painfully confusing or utterly meaningless.' Our
present mechanism of proceedings and appeals is undoubtedly too cum-
14. I.R. C. § 23 (a).
15. Id. § 115. The phrase first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1916, § 2(a), 39
STAT. 756, 757 (1916).
16. I. R. C. § 112 (c) and (d). In its present form the phrase first appeared in the
Revenue Act of 1924, § 203(d), (e), 43 STAT. 253, 257 (1924).
17. TwE~nErH CENmTU Fuixa, FACING THE TAX Paormm (1937) 490.
18. The classic example is the section exempting from distraint "one cow, two hogs,
five sheep and the wool thereof." I. R. C. § 3691(a) (3).
19. An outstanding example of the existing chaos may be found in the provisions
relating to liens for taxes. I. R. C. §§ 3670-3680.
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bersome and is ill-adapted to bear the large amount of highly specialized
litigation which it is compelled to carry.20
However, when most persons speak of the complexity of the income
tax statute, they are thinking of the complexity of its substantive
provisions. It is precisely these provisions which do not lend themselves
to simplification. Indeed, any future improvements are likely to be in
the direction of more rather than less complexity. A little reflection in-
escapably leads to the conclusion that simplicity and its attendant con-
sequences almost invariably jeopardize the interests of taxpayers. For
it can be asserted almost without qualification that the bulk of the income
tax sections, and certainly all of the longer provisions, are for their
benefit. The tax could be written with but five essential substantive sec-
tions.2" All of the rest of the statute is for the relief of the taxpayer.
This relief falls into certain general categories, which it may be appro-
priate to outline briefly.
In the first place, there is an extended list of deductions which may
be taken from gross income to compute net income. Indication has
already been given as to how this list has expanded from the time of
the first federal income tax law. The present Section 23 is about four
pages long, consisting of eighteen subsections besides the related sub-
sections of Section 117. Even so it has not yet reached a state in which
true net income may be ascertained with complete accuracy. The latest
addition was made in order to permit full deduction of losses from the
sale of depreciable property used in a trade or business. 2  Because such
property was previously within the definition of a "capital asset," a man-
ufacturer having an obsolescent machine was often tempted to continue
to use it or to junk it for its salvage value rather than be permitted only
a capital loss if he sold it. Such a sale will now result in a fully de-
ductible loss.
Adequate provision has yet to be made, however, for deduction of
previous net operating losses. The 1938 Act took a step in this direction
by including a subsection allowing a one-year net operating loss carry-
over in computing corporate surtaxes. 23 It might eventually be desirable
further to extend these carry-over provisions in the interest of securing
more equitable taxation as between corporations with steady incomes
and corporations with earnings subject to wide fluctuations.
20. For a thorough discussion of this problem, and a detailed suggestion for a much-
needed solution see Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income,
Estate, and Gift Taxes-a Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38 COL. L. Rtv. 1393.
21. I. R. C. §§ 11 and 12, which set forth the rates of tax applicable to individuals,
§ 22, which defines gross income; §§ 41 and 42, which set forth the general rules of ac-
counting and methods of allocating receipts.
22. I. R. C. § 117(a)(1).
23. Id. § 26 (c).
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A second group of provisions, closely related to tie first, grants deduc-
tions for income which is used for certain specified purposes and which
for reasons of equity is exempted from tax or taxed at a lower effective
rate. The deductions for charitable contributions" and amounts paid in
to employees' pension trusts2 ' are examples of this group. These deduc-
tions are allowed because such contributions partially relieve the Govern-
ment of the financial burden of contributing for the relief of distress and
the security of the aged. There are also the personal exemptions20 of
$2,500 and $1,000 allowed to married and single taxpayers respectively,
as well as the $400 credit for each dependent.2 Such exemptions are
based on the theory that the amount of income that is considered necessary
for subsistence should not be taxed.
The dividends-paid credit allowed to corporations for surtax purposes3
also belongs in this group, since the greater the percentage of distribution
by a corporation, the more taxes are collected from its individual share-
holders. Hence the Government can well compensate the corporation
for the consequent gain in revenue by correspondingly reducing its tax
liability.
A third group of sections also makes special provision for particular
kinds of income, in this case because of the source from which the income
is derived. Eighty-five per cent of the dividends received by a corpora-
tion are exempted from tax, -9 since otherwise a single distribution might
be fully taxed many times before reaching the hands of the individual
stockholders for whose ultimate benefit the distribution was made. The
credit for earned income3" is based on the theory that such income is
received subject to the necessity for setting part of it aside as an accumu-
lation of capital to provide for dependents after earning power is reduced
or ceases entirely. Income from interest, rents and dividends, on the
other hand, is not subject to such necessity since it represents an already
accumulated capital. Detailed provisions are also necessary in the case
of taxpayers having incomes from possessions of the United States,3 '
and in the case of non-resident aliens deriving a part of their income
from this country and a part from abroad. m
But the most important and controversial provisions in this group are
those dealing with the taxation of capital gains. Long ago the Supreme
Court decided that the term "income" included capital gains.' It has
always been felt that the inclusion of such gains in the statute was justi-
24. Id. §23(o), (q). 25. Id. § 2 3 (p).
26. Id. §25(b) (1). 27. Id. §25(b) (2).
28. Id. §27. 29. Id. §26(b).
30. Id. §25(a) (3), (4). 31. Id. §§251 and 252.
32. Id. §§ 119, 211-238.
33. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179 (1918); Hays v. Gauley 'Mountain
Coal Co., 247 U. S. 189 (1918) ; United States v. Cleveland, C., C. and St. L. Ry. Co.,
247 U. S. 195 (1918); Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509 (1921).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
fled, since it would not be reasonable to tax the salaried employee and
professional man while exempting the dealer and 9peculator in land or
securities. Until 1922 capital gains were taxed in their entirety at the full
normal and surtax rates, thus making for relative simplicity of statutory
language. Nevertheless, it was soon considered inequitable to tax in one
year a gain which might have accrued over a period of several years before
realization, where the tax was imposed at graduated rates. Accordingly,
all revenue acts starting with the 1921 Act have contained some device
whereby a lower effective rate is imposed on long-term capital gains than
upon ordinary recurrent income. Until 1934 this was done by giving the
individual his choice between the ordinary surtax brackets and a flat
rate on capital gains somewhat lower than the highest brackets. 4 This
system was obviously of benefit only to the wealthiest taxpayers. Nor
did it sufficiently take account of the length of time during which the
gain had accrued. It was found desirable to attempt a more equitable
and incidentally more complicated system; a system which would impose
a tax intended to approximate the aggregate tax which would have been
payable had the gain accrued evenly over the years for which the capital
asset was held and had an equal portion of the gain been taxed each year.
The 1934 Act therefore abandoned the optional rate and provided that
only a percentage of the gain was to be taken into account for tax
purposesY The longer the asset was held, the smaller the percentage
of gain taken into account.
This system was thought not to benefit sufficiently wealthy taxpayers
for whom the prescribed rates on gains taken into account ran as high
as 79 per cent. The 1938 Act therefore combined the schemes of the
1921 and 1934 Acts. Gains upon capital assets held for eighteen months
or less are taxed at the full normal and surtax rates. Long-term gains
are divided into two categories."6 Sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of
those upon capital assets held more than eighteen months and not more
than twenty-four months are taken into account for tax purposes, and
fifty per cent of the gains upon capital assets held more than twenty-four
months are similarly taken into account. The gains thus taken into ac-
count are included in the gross income of the taxpayer and taxed at the
full normal and surtax rates, or they are taxed at a flat rate of thirty
per cent,"7 whichever method results in the lesser tax. This scheme results
in subjecting long-term capital gains of those taxpayers whose highest
combined normal and surtax bracket is less than thirty per cent to taxa-
tion at two-thirds or one-half the rate applicable to other income. The
34. See Revenue Act of 1921, § 206, 42 STAT. 227, 232 (1921) and corresponding
sections of the Revenue Act of 1924, 1926, 1928 and 1932.
35. Revenue Act of 1934, § 117(a), 48 STAT. 680, 714, 76 U. S. C. § 101 (1934).
36. I. R. C. § 117(b).
37. Id. § 117(c) (1).
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long-term capital gains of taxpayers whose incomes exceed approximately
$45,000 are in effect taxed at a flat twenty or fifteen per cent rate.
The 1913 Act3" permitted no deduction of capital losses. Further
complications have been introduced into subsequent acts by the allow-
ance of such a deduction to a varying extent. The 1938 Act is particu-
larly liberal, and lengthy, in this respect. Short-term losses are deductible
only from short-term gains," but a one-year carry-over of the excess of
such losses is permitted, to be applied against the short-term gains of
the following year." Long-term losses taken into account are deductible
from gross income or thirty per cent of such losses are credited against
the tax, whichever method results in a greater tax.4" This means, in
effect, that smaller taxpayers may deduct from gross income two-thirds
or one-half of their capital losses accruing over more than eighteen
months, while larger taxpayers may reduce their taxes to the extent of
fifteen or twenty per cent of such losses.
The capital gains provisions thus far outlined by no means end the
matter. In order to stimulate the free flow of capital and in order that
normal business transactions shall not be unduly hampered, the Act does
not "recognize" a large number of capital gains as income. If Company
A transfers all its assets to a newly-formed Company B, and the share-
holders of Company A receive stock of Company B in exchange for their
old equities in Company A which have appreciated in value, the share-
holders are in substantially the same position as before the exchange,
regardless of the fact that a technical gain has been realized.42 It would
be unfair and burdensome to impose a tax under such circumstances,
until the securities received in exchange are later sold. This and similar
situations are cared for by the so-called reorganization sections. 43 Because
of the complexity of many of the transactions involved, these provisions
are among the longest in the statute and require corresponding adjust-
ments in many other sections.
The 1938 Act provided for the non-recognition of gain upon certain
exchanges effected by registered holding companies in obedience to orders
of the Securities and Exchange Commission." It also postponed the
taxation of gains in excess of accumulated earnings or profits realized
upon the liquidation of personal holding companies.' A step too was
taken towards equalizing the treatment of losses resulting from worth-
38. 38 STAT. 114 (1913), 43 U. S. C. §152 (1934).
39. . R. C. § 117(d) (2).
40. Id. § 117(e).
41. Id. §117(c) (2).
42. See Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U. S. 176 (1921); Cullinan v. Walker,
262 U. S. 134 (1923); Marr v. United States, 26S U. S. 536 (1925).
43. I. R. C. H8 111, 112, 113.
44. Id. Supplement R, § 371-373.
45. Id. § 112(b).
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lessness and losses due to sales of property which had depreciated in
value.46 A loss upon a security which had become worthless was previ-
ously deductible in full,4" whereas a loss upon the sale of a security which
had not become totally worthless was subject to the capital loss provi-
sions. This often resulted in the retention of depreciating securities until
they became of no value, in order to secure a full deduction. To remedy
this situation, a loss due to a security becoming worthless is now con-
sidered a capital loss.
The fourth group of relief provisions assures favored tax treatment
to a wide variety of special classes of taxpayers. Some of this favored
treatment is eminently justifiable. For instance, the unfairness that would
result from applying the individual surtax rates to the net incomes of
corporations is obvious to all. Even further relief is warranted in the
case of the very small corporation. Presumably it is young and growing,
it does not have ready access to the capital market and may need to
retain a large proportion of its'earnings. Accordingly, corporations with
incomes not in excess of $25,000 are taxed at an effective rate48 lower
than that applicable to the minority of corporations, 40 and they are not
subject to the two and one-half per cent undistributed profits tax differ-
ential.
Still greater concessions are made to trusts and partnerships. In the
case of a corporation, a tax is imposed .upon the receipt of income by the
corporation and another tax is later imposed on the beneficial owners
upon receipt by them of the same income in the form of dividends 0 A
trust, on the other hand, is taxed separately only on that part of its
income which is not currently distributed to the beneficiaries." A part-
nership is not taxed at all. The distributive shares of its income are
included in the returns of the partner, whether distributed or not6 2 In
this connection note the further relief, and the further complication,
contained in the Revenue Act of 1938. Obviously, in order to ascertain
the distributive shares of the partners, the net income of the partner-
ship must be separately computed. 3 Under prior acts, the result of such
computation was that partnership capital losses were not available to
offset the capital gains of the individual partners. And if a partner had
sustained a net capital loss, it could not be deducted from his share of
the net capital gain of the partnership. In order to remedy this situation,
the 1938 Act provided that the ordinary income and the capital gains
and losses of a partnership are to be segregated. 4 A partner's distributive
share of the ordinary income is to be added to his individual income, and
46. Id. § 23(k) (2). 47. Regulations 94, Art. 23(k) 4.
48. I. R. C. § 14. 49. Id. § 13(a).
50. Id. § 115. 51. Id. § 162(b).
52. Id. §§ 181, 182. 53. Id. § 183(a).
54. Id. §183(b).
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his distributive share of the net capital gain or loss is to be separately
included in his individual net capital gain or loss computation.
There is also some justification for the favored treatment granted by
the Statute to insurance companies," and there is ample ground for the
exemption accorded to charitable"0 and civic organizations," farmers'
cooperatives, 5s voluntary employees' benefit associations"2 and employees'
pension trusts,60 certain quasi-municipal utilities,"' and a host of other
organizations, each of which may require a separate subsection in the
Act or a long series of additional sections.
On the other hand, numerous special deductions and exemptions which
have insinuated themselves into the Statute are completely indefensible
from the standpoint of tax equity. There is no apparent reason for the
complete exemption of building and loan associations(" and for the almost
complete exemption of China Trade Act corporations.' The present
depletion provisions" result in a hidden subsidy to the oil and mining
industries. The exclusion from taxation as dividends of distributions
made from earnings or profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913 0
results in the shareholders of a few corporations securing treatment more
favorable than that accorded the generality of shareholders. Despite
increasing sentiment for a legislative change, 0 the notorious exemption
of interest on state and municipal securities is still a part of the Statute."'
Once provisions of this type have wormed their way into the Statute, it
is almost impossible to extricate them, supported as they are by the
clamor of the special interests for whose benefit they were enacted. How-
ever, further complexity along these lines can be avoided by resisting any
additional special treatment for special interests. The burden of every
tax favor granted by Congress falls upon the average taxpayer. Every
revenue loss occasioned by a concession to an isolated class must neces-
sarily be paid for by the tax-paying public.
The foregoing discussion logically leads to the next group of provi-
sions - a group which is responsible for the most detailed and involved
portions of the income tax law - namely, those sections of the Act which
55. Id. §§201-207. 56. Id. § 101(6).
57. Id. §101(8). 58. Id. §101 (12), (13).
59, Id. § 101 (16). 60. Id. § 165.
61. Id. §116(d), (e). 62. Id. §101(4).
63. Id. §§ 261-265. 64. Id . §§23(m), 114(b).
65. Id. § 115(b).
66. In two messages to Congress, dated April 25, 1938, and January 19, 1939, the
President recommended the enactment of legislation imposing federal income ta.x= upon
interest on future issues of state and municipal obligations and upon salaries received
in the future by state and municipal employees. He also recommended that the states ha
given power to tax the interest upon future issues of federal obligations and the salaries
received in the future by federal employees. Those of his recommendations vwhich relate
to salaries are embodied in the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, cffetive April 12, 1939.
67. I. P_ C. § 22 (b) (4).
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are designed to prevent avoidance of taxes. At first blush these sections
would scarcely seem to be relief provisions. That the characterization is
apt, however, will appear after a moment's reflection. If certain large
taxpayers escape their proportionate share of the tax burden, the burden
on the taxpaying public is correspondingly increased. Every provision
which brings in fugitive tax dollars relieves the average taxpayer of a
part of that burden. For the very reason that these sections deal with
a class of taxpayers which, by definition, is prone to take advantage of
every discoverable loophole in the law, it is particularly important that
they be made evasion-proof. Every conceivable situation intended to be
covered must in some way be brought within the scope of the language
of the Statute; otherwise the provisions will be mere sound and fury.
To close the many loopholes which the taxpayer's ingenuity may uncover
often requires an abundance of verbiage. Moreover, the devices which
are used to avoid taxes are often very intricate and only intricate pro-
visions can deal with them adequately. Therefore there are about fourteen
pages devoted to personal holding companies, domestic 8 and foreign, 0
two pages to corporations improperly accumulating surplus, 0 a long
section dealing with losses from wash sales,7 several sections devoted to
the problem of revocable trusts"' and many others devoted to equally
complicated devices. These provisions do not make easy reading, but it
must be remembered that they are not aimed at the unsophisticated.
Loophole plugging is not, however, confined to certain isolated por-
tions of the Statute. It is almost axiomatic that nearly every general
relief provision granted by Congress was taken advantage of by some
taxpayers. It would be simple to prevent this by abrogating the relief
provisions altogether, but the more equitable method which has generally
been adopted is to restrict their application. Hence, many of the pro-
visions which grant relief are hedged about by innumerable qualifica-
tions. One of the earliest examples relates to the deduction of interest.
It was found that some taxpayers were borrowing money to invest in
tax-exempt securities. They paid no tax upon the income from the invest-
ment, while decreasing their taxable income by deducting the interest
paid to make the investment. Instead of denying to all taxpayers the
privilege of deducting interest from gross income, Congress theroipon
added a few words to thc Act which stopped this particular practice
while continuing to make the deduction available for other purposes. 3
The privilege of a limited deduction of losses was not taken away when
it was found that some taxpayers created fictitious losses by selling
depreciated securities one day and buying them back the next, or by
68. Id. §§ 500-511. 69. Id. Supplement P, §§ 331-340.
70. Id. § 102. 71. Id. § 118.
72. Id. §§ 166, 167. 73. Id. §23(b).
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fictitious sales to specially created trusts or close relatives. 4 Particular
provisions were written into the Act to cover these situations. The trust
device has been employed in a variety of ways by the ingenious tax-
avoider but still not all trust income is taxed to the grantor. Instead, only
the income from those types of trusts which can most easily be used for
the avoidance of taxes7 5 is so taxed.
Another favorite method by which the Statute was used to secure an
unfair advantage appeared when a taxpayer claimed a deduction which
he had already taken in an earlier year with respect to which the assertion
of a deficiency was barred by the Statute of Limitations. If the later
year was then finally determined by the courts to be the proper one in
which to take the deductions, the taxpayer congratulated himself upon
having secured a double deduction by maintaining an inconsistent posi-
tion with respect to two different taxable years. The variations of this
device were infinite, and it must be conceded that the Government had
a few in its own repertory.7" Section 820 of the 1938 Act attempted
to remedy the resulting chaos. 77 If, in certain specified situations, it is
finally determined that a certain item is to be included in or deducted
from gross income in any taxable year, and such item was also included
or deducted in a previous year, an adjustment will be made with respect
to the tax for the previous year despite the fact that such adjustment
would otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations. The Section
is long and very complicated, even though it does not cover every situa-
tion of this type. But it was a monumental task to remedy this defect in
the tax laws, while preserving, at the same time, the principle that the
Statute of Limitations should insure a decent burial of stale claims.
Much of the extensive friction and litigation which is concerned solely
with allocating items to the proper year should be eliminated by these
new provisions. Any perfection of Section 820 will probably require its
further expansion.
Only a brief outline has been given of the many varied and complex
transactions which the provisions of the income tax law must encompass.
There are a multitude of other situations which have not even been con-
sidered. It is a commonplace that modem economic life is extraordinarily
complex, but the implications of this fact are not sufficiently realized in
the field of tax legislation. We can and should modify our administrative
procedure; we can and should eliminate much of the present overlapping
of state and federal taxation. But since we have a revenue law which
74. Id. §§ 118, 24(b).
75. Id. §§ 166, 167.
76. For a picture of the situation before the enactment of Section 870, not, Section
3801 of the Internal Revenue Code, see Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choce and Similar
Practices in Federal Taxation (1935) 48 IUnv. L. Rsv. 1281.
77. For an excellent and exhaustive analysis of the section, see Maguire, Surrey and
Traynor, Section 82o of the Revenue Act of z938 (1939) 48 YALE L J. 509.
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measureg taxable capacity by so complex a standard as net income, that
law cannot and should not be simple in structure. The elimination of
any of the more important relief provisions would produce gross inequity
and great hardship for many taxpayers; this would seem to be too high
a price to pay for a statute readily comprehensible to all. As Sir Josiah
Stamp, the eminent British authority on revenue matters, has said:
"It may not be out of place .. . to register a deliberate opinion
that the clamour for a simple Income Tax, which he who runs may
read, is an absurd "one. In many particulars, not always the most
important, the existing chaos of rules can indeed be greatly simpli-
fied, but if the tax is to be so highly subjective as to reflect every
slight difference in ability, on grounds of aggregate amount of
income, marital condition, family responsibility, character of income,
elements of capital, origin and source of profits, and all the other
differentiae which are now urged, then, unless it is to be reduced to
the status of a voluntary offering, it must be a complicated system.
"The United States had a full opportunity to get a simple system,
having no previous commitments, and the great advantage of a pro-
longed study of other nations. Within a few months there were
widespread complaints that the law and system were 'irritatingly
incomprehensible.' In 1915 I was prompted to write, 'There is the
usual failure to see that modern life and modern commerce are so
complex and diversified that to expect a tax form which shall read
like a pill advertisement on the railway, and yet close down upon
every case, is asking for the moon.'"78
This statement was made before the Royal Commission on the Income
Tax in 1920. Thus the campaign for simplification is scarcely new. It
is the perennial cry of the bewildered taxpayer. From 1851 to 1928
eight special commissions have been appointed in England to inquire
into the practicability of simplification. In this country we have heard
strident complaints about the complexity of the income tax almost since
its inception. By 1927 these complaints had reached a crescendo, and
the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation carefully considered
how the income tax could best be simplified. Its report resulted in a
much ndeded rearrangement of the law in the 1928 act,70 so that the
ordinary taxpayer was thenceforth able to find the material most likely
to affect his return collected at the beginning of the Act. Some minor
administrative changes were also made, but on the subject of a law simple
in its substantive provisions the Committee reached the following con-
clusion:
"It must be recognized that while a degree of simplification is
possible, a simple income tax for complex business is not. The task
78. Testimony of Dr. J. C. Stamp before the British Royal Commission on the
Income Tax, August 1, 1919. Cmd. 615, Minutes of Evidence, I, 19481 (1920).
79. 45 STAT. 791 (1928).
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is to simplify the law and the administration for all taxpayers so far
as possible, without causing real hardship to those with complex
sources of income and varied business enterprises who can not be
taxed justly under a simple, elementary law."80
In view of the almost unanimous opinion of taxpayers, lawyers, ac-
countants and many legislators that the income tax law is written in an
incomprehensible technical jargon, there is an astonishing dearth of
specific suggestions as to just how the law could be simplified. The usual
advocate of simplicity, when pressed for concrete proposals, frequently
wanders off into airy generalities, remarking that the actual details must,
of course, be worked out by a technical staff. Occasionally, however,
he is so incensed by the obfuscations of a particular provision that he
asserts that he could render the same passage into a brand of English
positively lyric in its simplicity. \Vlhen asked to do so, the product is
almost invariably a short simple sentence which is either meaningless
or reaches a result quite different from that which was intended.
These phenomena are apparently not confined to this side of the
Atlantic. In the report of the Colwyn Commission in England there
appears the following paragraph, rather admirable in its restraint:
"We have been guided also in our deliberations by a desire that
the machinery of taxation should not be made more complicated,
but that it should be simplified at any point where simplification is
consistent with justice and common sense. A plea for simplicity was
made by a great number of witnesses, some of them experts in deal-
ing with Income Tax matters on behalf of the public, but we found
their suggestions generally vague and indefinite. They were either
unable to give us concrete or definite proposals, or, where they did
make proposals, we found that to adopt them would be to do in-
justice to taxpayers whose peculiar circumstances would not have
been recognized, or to expose the Revenue unnecessarily to tle risk
of loss. We have formed the opinion that in Income Tax matters
simplicity is not the sole object to be aimed at, and that the price
that would have to be paid for a simple Income Tax could not be
justified." 8 1
Any provision of a tax law sounds simple when it is stated in general
terms. This is because the results intended to be reached usually are
fairly simple. Complications ensue only when there is an attempt to
effect these results by statutory language which will apply with certainty
in all cases. For example, the language of the surtax on undistributed
80. 1 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMmITTEE ox INTm.AL REVE.uE TAXATxo:. (1927) 5.
81. REPORT OF THE RoYAL COMMISSION ON THE INCOME TAX (1920) Cmd. 615,
11 649. A good example is to be found in the testimony of Mr. A. If. Brenner, Minutes
of Evidence, Part II, 1115,491. He had complained about obscurity and complexity.
When asked whether he had formulated a satisfactory definition of "Profits and Gains,"
he replied, "No, the Long Vacation was not long enough to enable me to do that"
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profits contained in the 1936 Act 2 was generally hailed as a super-
technical monstrosity. When the corporate tax plan of the 1938 Act was
announced, newspaper editorials appeared in praise of its clarity and
simplicity. The corporate normal tax and the surtax on undistributed
profits were to be abolished. In their stead corporations with net incomes
not in excess of $25,000 were to be taxed at a progressive rate ranging
from twelve and one-half to sixteen per cent. 3 Corporations with in-
comes exceeding $25,000 were to be taxed at a flat rate of nineteen
per cent, reduced by a credit of two and one-half per cent of the amount
of dividends paid.8 This was indeed comprehensible to anyone having
a background of grammar school arithmetic. But this paragon of sim-
plicity required more than six pages when put into statutory language.
Provision had to be made to prevent a corporation with an income of
$25,001 from incurring a tax liability over $1,000 greater than that
of a corporation with an income of $25,000.0 A provision had to be
made to prevent a corporation from securing a dividends-paid credit in
excess of its adjusted net income.8" Provisions were inserted for the
relief of corporations in special circumstances 87 and of corporations whose
shareholders were willing to include their ratable shares of the corporate
income in their individual returns even though such income was undis-
tributed. 88 A score of other problems had to be solved, each of which
required some expansion of the language of the relevant sections, with
the result, sad to relate, that one of these sections, dealing with the
dividend carry-over,89 has been sarcastically quoted both on the floor of
the House90 and on the editorial page of the New York Times t as an
example of "pure limpid English." However, it is probably impossible
to draft a less complicated sounding provision which would contain the
really simple rule set forth in that section,
There are nevertheless several suggestions for simplifying the income
tax which do not involve removing either relief provisions or the safe-
guards with which those provisions must necessarily be surrounded. It
may be appropriate to make a few observations upon the four plans most
frequently and plausibly advocated:
1. The first of these involves the frequent complaint that taxable
income does not in all instances correspond to accounting income. It is
asserted that if the two disparate income concepts could be made to
coincide, a much simpler statute would result. This argument, of course,
assumes the infallibility of accounting methods in clearly reflecting net
82. REVENuE Acr oF 1936, §§ 14, 26 and 27, 49 STAT. 1648, 1655, 1664, 1665 (1936).
83. I. R. C. § 14(c). 84. Id. § 13(c).
85. Id. § 13(d). 86. Id. §§26(b), 27(b)(1).
87. Id. §§ 14, 26(c) (1), 27(a) (4). 88. Id. § 28.
89. Id. § 27(c). 90. 83 CONG. REC. 3737 (1938).
91. N. Y. Times, March 5, 1938, p. 16, col. 1.
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income, whereas as a matter of fact accounting technique, like legal
technique, involves a constant use of fictions. Even granting the premise,
the law must in some measure formulate its own rules of accounting,
since different types of taxpayers may use widely varied accounting
methods. In any case, because income must still be determined upon an
annual basis for the purposes of taxation, 2 it is necessary that definite
rules be laid down fixing the proper year in which various items arise.
These rules are bound to differ somewhat from the ordinary accounting
methods which are more at liberty to take prior and future years into
consideration. The disparity could largely be cured by a statute which
measured income by a period longer than a year, but such a cure would
be in the direction of greater and not less complexity.
2. A second plan advocates some sort of optional tax on gross in-
come. The taxpayer might elect to pay a lower rate of tax upon his
gross income than the prevailing rate upon net income. In another form,
it is suggested that he might, at his election, take a blanket deduction
of a fixed percentage of his gross income, say ten per cent, in lieu of
the numerous specified deductions allowed by the present law. Aside from
the revenue loss inherent in this proposal, its basic difficulty lies, sur-
prisingly enough, in its complexity. It would mean putting additional
sections into the Act. It would also mean that the taxpayer would still
have to compute his net income in order to decide whether or not it was
to his advantage to exercise the option. It is hard to envision the spectacle
of taxpayers en msse paying the optional tax merely because they were
too lazy to determine whether the more complicated alternative resulted
in a lesser liability.
3. The third and most widely advocated suggestion involves a new
departure in legislative drafting of the income tax. The contention is
made that it is a hopeless task to write a statute which will include every
detail and cover every conceivable case. Such attempts, it is asserted,
result in making confusion worse confounded, and in opening up new
loopholes as fast as the old ones are closed. The alternative is said to
be a statute setting forth merely the important general rules, the appli-
cation of those rules being left to the courts.
Without doubt such a drafting scheme would result in a statute simply
and clearly stated. But it would certainly not result in a simple tax
law.9 3 The same details would have to be worked out, and the same
long series of specific applications determined. But instead of being
largely collected between the covers of one Act of Congress, they would
be discoverable only by thumbing through an infinite number of scattered
92. I.R.C. §41.
93. See Alvord, Possibilities of Future Tax Law Simplification (1929) 6 NAT.
Ixco~m TAx MAG. 365 for an ezcellent analysis of some of the difficulties inherent in
this proposal.
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court decisions. It is already irritating enough to have to consult in-
numerable cases, opinions and rulings in order to determine some obscure
point in the law, and such irritations necessarily would be many times
multiplied. The judicial mill is already choked with tax cases; the problem
is to lighten the load and not to increase it. Increased litigation means
increased costs of collection, which in turn mean higher taxes and also
greater expense to the taxpayer. In effect, it means a subsidy for the
tax attorneys.
Furthermore, increased litigation results in greater delays and uncer-
tainties. The tax liabilities of the majority of taxpayers can still be
ascertained by referring to the Revenue Acts, even though it may often
take some concentrated effort to do so. Under a statute written exclu-
sively in general terms, no tax liability could be determined until the
courts had passed upon the specific question involved. This would usually
take several years. And when we speak of the courts, we actually mean
the Supreme Court. Few tax questions are ever put at rest until they
have been interred in the United States Supreme Court Reports, except
in the rare instances in which every Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Court of Claims are in accord and no writ of certiorari is granted. In
the meantime, the issue is usually obscured by a mass of conflicting
decisions.
Nor is the Supreme Court itself invariably prompt to illuminate every
dark corner of an obscure problem. Remarkably enough, the general
provisions of the statutes give the most trouble. Some of the undefined
general terms in the Revenue Act which have occasioned the most un-
certainty have already been enumerated. The last judicial words on
"ordinary and necessary expenses," 94 "other property or money,"05 and
"earnings or profits,"0" have yet to be spoken. It is nineteen years since
the famous case of Eisner v. Macomber"7 decided that a common stock
dividend paid to common stockholders was not income. But many of
the problems connected with stock dividends are still with us, and the
recent decisions"8 on the subject have only produced further confusion.
It is twenty-six years since the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment,
yet in certain important respects its construction is still in doubt, and this
despite the fact that, as Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out, its "known
purpose was to get rid of nice questions.""0 We have had a Constitution
for more than 150 years, and yet its application to many recurring legis-
lative problems is still in doubt and subject to occasional reversal of
opinion. Again it is the general provisions which occasion the most
94. I. R. C. §23(a). 95. Id. § 112 (c), (d).
96. Id. § 115. 97. 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
98. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S.
238 (1937) ; Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U. S. 247 (1937).
99. In his dissenting opinion in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 219 (1920).
1216 [Vol. 48: 1200
1939] SIMPLIFICATION OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1217
dispute. The prospect of having a specific tax question finally settled
during the old age of the taxpayer's great-great-grandchildren is not a
happy one.
A recent article in the Columbia Law Review' 01 attacked the Revenue
Act of 1937 on the ground that its provisions were too detailed and that
by their very explicitness they excluded reasonable latitude in determining
which personal holding companies were being used primarily for the
avoidance of individual surtaxes. The Act, of course, defines personal
holding companies... and personal holding company income 1 2 in great
detail. The article concedes that the fifty per cent stock ownership require-
ment and the five individual group requirement will have to be retained.
But it suggests that the statutory test should be, not whether fifty per
cent or more of the stock is owned, directly or indirectly, by not more
than five individuals, but rather whether such amount of stock be owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by not more than five individuals.
This change, it is asserted, will make possible the removal of the long
and complicated sections dealing with ownership by members of a family
or partnership, or through corporations, estates, trusts and option agree-
ments.' Similarly, it is suggested that the lengthy provisions dealing
with disallowed losses upon sales between members of a family, part-
nership or trust' could be done away with by a short statement that
"the loss upon the sale or other disposition of property shall not be recog-
nized where the seller retains control, directly or indirectly, over the
property which is the subject-matter of the sale."
Such amendments would very much simplify the appearance of the
Act. Unfortunately, the word "control" is both vague and indefinite.
Its meaning, as here applied, could be ascertained only after many ad-
ministrative rulings had run the gamut of the courts. Even after a body
of decisions had been built up covering some disputed points, few hold-
ing companies would ever be certain, from year to year, whether they
were liable for the surtax. Moreover, the word "control" has many sub-
jective implications which are impossible to determine accurately in a
specific case. Does a man have more effective control of stock owned
by his grandson or of stock owned by his nephew? Does he control more
effectively the stock of a mother-in-law, whose affairs he manages, or
the stock of a daughter dominated by a husband who dislikes him? This
proposal would clutter up the dockets with just such absurdities. No
provisions of our revenue laws are more productive of irritation than
those which cause taxability to depend upon subjective tests. A tax lawyer
would hate to be called upon to define accurately stock "controlled" by
an individual, just as he would hate to have to define with precision a
100. Angell, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance (1938) 38 Cor. L REv. 80.
101. 1. R. C. § 501. 102. Id. § 502.
103. Id. § 503. 104. Id. §24(b).
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gift made in contemplation of death °5 or a corporation formed or
availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax
upon its shareholders.'0 0
4. The final suggestion for simplification to be mentioned is one pro-
posing the enactment of a statute in general terms, leaving the details
to be filled in by administrative regulation. 7 Unless the Commissioner's
rulings were rendered immune from judicial review, this suggestion would
have the same result as a general statute interpreted by the courts, so it
is open to the same objections and there is little additional to be said
of it. The Bureau of Internal Revenue is already overburdened; to force
it to write as well as to administer the revenue law would make for much
inefficiency and delay. Its personnel is constantly changing, with the
result that it is difficult to secure uniform consistency in its rulings. The
1938 Act conferred upon it a discretionary authority to enter into closing
agreements with respect to taxable years not yet terminated. 0 8 This
and certain other additional burdens are all that it can adequately handle
at the present time. Merely because simplification of the substantive
portions of the income tax law is, in general, neither feasible nor desir-
able, no inference is intended here that a real improvement of the Statute
is impracticable. Such improvements as are now contemplated, or that
may be contemplated in the future, are, however, likely to increase the
complexity of the Act rather than to simplify it.
Much remains to be done towards securing greater equity and greater
certainty. For example, it might be desirable to formulate a satisfactory
definition of "earnings or profits," in order that individuals may be better
able to ascertain whether the distributions they receive are taxable"'0
and in order that corporations may be enabled to know in advance whether
the distributions they make will secure them a dividends-paid credit." 0
Much of the existing confusion with respect to the proper treatment of
assumptions of indebtedness in corporate reorganizations needs to be
eliminated,"' as does the confusion with respect to constitutionally taxable
105. Id. § 811 (c).
106. Id. § 102. See (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1105.
107. For a more detailed discussion of the implications of this proposal, see Green,
Simplification and the Federal Tax on Earned Incomes (1928) 6 NAT. IxCOME TAX
MAG. 47.
108. I. R. C. § 3760.
109. Id. §115(a).
110. Id. §§27(b) (1), 335, 504(a).
111. See United States v. Hendler, 303 U. S. 564 (1938). The problem resolves
itself into two parts: (1) whether, and to what extent, gain should be recognized to the
transferor corporation in a reorganization exchange because of the mere fact that such
corporation has transferred its liabilities along with its assets; and (2) whether the
assumption should remove the transaction from the benefits of the reorganization sections
altogether if such transaction takes the form of an exchange of substantially all the prop-
erty or 80 per cent of the voting stock of the transferor for voting stock of the trans-
feree. See I. R. C. § 112(g) (1) (B).
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stock dividends distributed prior to 1936.1" All this will add to the bulk
of the Statute. It would be desirable to remedy the inequity that exists
as between married taxpayers in the eight community property states
and married taxpayers in the rest of the country. In forty states and the
District of Columbia, a husband is taxed upon all h-is earnings. In the
remaining eight states, because of their local property laws, the earnings
of the husband may be taxed one-half to the wife and one-half to the
husband,.. 3 thus often materially reducing their combined surtax liability.
Some provision will eventually have to be worked out to remedy this
situation, but it will result in greater complexity. It might be desirable
to expand the present deduction of expenses incidental to a trade or
business to include all expenses properly and reasonably incurred in the
collection or production of all types of income. This would not be an
easy provision to write in a few short sentences. The tax burden needs
to be equalized as between corporations with normally steady incomes
and corporations with violently fluctuating earnings. But greater liber-
ality in the allowance of net operating losses will still further amplify the
Revenue Act. These are only a few of the proposals which are worthy
of present consideration.
In the last analysis, the bewilderment of the average small taxpayer
whose income is derived from wages and salaries has been somewhat
exaggerated. Nearly ninety per cent of all individual taxpayers filing
112. Until the decision in Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936), it had uni-
versally been supposed that, in the case of a stock dividend, the basis of the stock upon
which the dividend was declared was to be allocated betw.een the old stock and the stock
distributed. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 22(a) (8) and corresponding articles of
prior Regulations. The Kosiand case involved the distribution to stockholders of a
class of stock different from that which they held and decided that, upon a subsequent
sale of the old stock, the basis of such stock should be its full cost. Helvering v. Gowran,
302 U. S. 238 (1937), relating to a comparable situation, decided that the basis of the new
stock should be zero. It is possible that a taxpayer who, prior to 1936, had sold his new
stock and had computed gain or loss upon an allocated basis, may now claim that, under
the Koshland case, his old stock should have a full cost basis. If the assertion of a defi-
ciency with respect to the earlier year is now barred by the Statute of Limitations, he
may recover tax-free more than his cost. Conversely, a taxpayer who had previously
sold his old stock and computed gain or loss upon an allocated basis may be denied
recovery of his full cost tax-free because the new stock should have a zero basis.
The same problem does not arise after 1935, since the 1936 Act taxed as a ditidend all
distributions which might constitutionally be so taxed. RE xUE Acr op 1936, § 115(f).
This provision has been continued in subsequent Acts. Inasmuch as the Koslaand and
Gowran cases held distributions in a different class of stock to be constitutionally taxable
as dividends, such a distribution is now taxable upon receipt to the extent of its full
market value. The old stock retains its full cost basis and the new stock acquires a basis
in the amount of market value at the time of distribution.
113. Poe v. Seabom, 282 U. S. 101 (1930) ; Goodell v. Kod, 2P_ U. S. 118 (1930);
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U. S. 122 (1930) ; Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U. S. 127 (1930) ; United
States v. 'Malcolm, 282 U. S. 792 (1931).
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returns for 1935 reported incomes of less than $5,000." 4 Their tax law
consists solely of the return. Most of them have never seen the involved
Revenue Act or the equally involved Regulations. The form of return
which they file is now very simple."' And while the instructions accom-
panying it can scarcely be cited as outstanding examples of a simple prose
style, they are not as incomprehensible to the average person as are other
legally-phrased documents with which he is periodically confronted, such
as mortgages, insurance policies and conditional sales contracts. On the
other hand, no matter how relatively simple the income tax could be
made, the larger taxpayer would be compelled to seek professional advice
with respect to his more complicated transactions. Lawyers no longer
regard tax law as an esoteric technique to be employed only by the spe-
cialists. They have come to realize that they must have at least a working
knowledge of a field which so vitally affects the interests of their clients.
Indispensable as it is to an adequate knowledge of many other branches
of the law, they are discovering that its mysteries are not as unfathom-
able as they had once supposed. Simplicity is not a goal per se, and it
is definitely undesirable when it conflicts with the major objectives of
a good tax system. Because they interpret the law to the taxpaying public,
the responsibility of urging the proper kind of tax reform rests upon the
members of the bar. They can do much by refusing to press for special
favors to special interests, thereby preventing a few individuals from
profiting at the expense of the general public. They can do even more
by opposing the elimination of material portions of the revenue laws
when such elimination is proposed in the name of simplification alone.
114. Statistics of Income for 1935.
115. Form 1040 A, applicable to most individual taxpayers having incomes less than
$5,000, was materially simplified in 1937. Form 1140 A, applicable to the almost 90 per
cent of corporations whose incomes do not exceed $25,000, has also been greatly sim-
plified.
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By the appointments of Dean Charles E. Clark to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and of Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas to the
Supreme Court, the Yale School of Law has been deprived of two of the most
distinguished members of its staff. The debt owed to them by the J0URNA, is
manifest in many of its pages. Their contributions to the growth of the School
and the progress of legal education are permanent monuments to their scholar-
ship and service. For ten years Judge Clark has served the School as Dean
and has guided it during a period of notable growth in which Mr. Justice
Douglas was a powerful factor. We extend to them both warm wishes for
happy judicial careers.
